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Still A Ball of Confusion: KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. 
By 
Nikki Pope1
© 2005, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
 
I.  Introduction 
In KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,2 the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that a defendant in a trademark infringement action is not required to prove an 
absence of confusion to successfully assert the fair use affirmative defense.  While most 
observers and interested parties expected the Court to rule as it did, the ruling further obfuscated 
trademark law, doing little to clarify the relation of “likelihood of confusion” to fair use.  The 
opinion overturned a Ninth Circuit decision and rejected the notion that fair use and consumer 
confusion cannot co-exist.3  The opinion did not, however, foreclose the consideration of 
likelihood of confusion in the face of a successful fair use defense.  This note reviews basic 
trademark concepts applicable to the fair use defense in Part II; examines the factual background 
of the case in Part III; discusses the District and Appellate Court holdings in Parts IV and V; and 
analyzes the Supreme Court opinion and considers the fair use questions that were unasked and 
unanswered in Part VI. 
 
                                                 
1Ms. Pope is an attorney in the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice; J.D., Santa Clara 
University School of Law, Order of the Coif.  M.B.A., Kellogg School of Management.  B.A., Carleton College.  
The author wishes to thank Rajiv Dharnidharka and Carolyn Renner for reviewing earlier drafts.  Special thanks to 
the author’s mother, Lena Pope, and to professors Allen Hammond and Ellen Kreitzberg for their advice and 
support.  The views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not purported to reflect those of the 
United States Department of Justice.   
2KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004) (“KP 3”). 
3Id. at 550. 
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II.  Fair Use Basic Concepts 
A trademark owner may defend her trademark against infringement under the federal 
trademark statutes4 or under common law.  Although trademarks do not need to be registered to 
be valid and enforceable, the trademark owner benefits from registration.  One important benefit 
of trademark registration is the acquisition of incontestable status for a mark.5  To attain 
incontestability a trademark must meet four requirements: (1) there must be no final decisions 
that are adverse to the registrant’s rights in the mark; (2) there must be no pending proceedings 
in the Patent and Trademark Office or any court involving the registrant’s trademark rights; (3) 
an affidavit must be filed in the sixth year of the mark’s registration with five consecutive years 
of use prior to filing; and (4) the mark cannot be the generic name for the registered product or 
service.6  Incontestability conveys important benefits to the registrant.  The mark is presumed 
valid and registered.7  The registrant is presumed to own the mark and have the exclusive right to 
use the mark.8  Finally, if the mark is descriptive, it is presumed to have acquired a secondary 
meaning.9
To prove infringement, the trademark owner must show that there is a likelihood of 
                                                 
4Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2004). 
515 U.S.C. § 1065. 
6Id. 
715 U.S.C. § 1115(b). 
8Id. 
915 U.S.C. § 1052; Park‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985); Entrepreneur Media v. 
Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002); see also  MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, § 5:5 (“The prime element of 
secondary meaning is a mental association in buyers’ minds between the alleged mark and a single source of the 
product.”). 
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consumer confusion concerning the source, sponsorship or affiliation of the goods or services in 
question, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a): 
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant, use in commerce 
any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark in 
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any 
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action by 
the registrant . . . 10
A party defending against an allegation of trademark infringement may avail himself of a 
number of affirmative defenses, one of which is “fair use.”11  There are two types of fair use 
defense under trademark law—statutory (also known as “classic”) and nominative.12  Statutory 
fair use applies when a defendant uses a trademark to describe his own product or service.13  
Nominative fair use applies when a defendant uses a trademark to describe the trademark 
owner’s product or service.14  Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4), statutory fair use is defined as 
“a use, otherwise than as a mark, . . . of a term or devise which is descriptive of and used fairly 
and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of [the allegedly infringing] party”.15  A 
                                                 
1015 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
1115 U.S.C. § 1115(b). 
12J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 11:45 (4th ed., 2004) 
(AMCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS@).  
13Id. 
14Id. 
1515 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). 
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grocer who advertises, “Give an Apple to Your Teacher,” during the back-to-school shopping 
season may argue a statutory fair use defense against an allegation of infringement brought by 
Apple Computer.   
The nominative fair use defense was created by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
New Kids on the Block.16  Nominative fair use requires three elements: (1) plaintiff’s product 
cannot be identified without use of its mark; (2) defendant used only so much of plaintiff’s mark 
as was necessary; and (3) defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark does not suggest sponsorship, 
endorsement, or other unauthorized affiliation.17  Using “Playmate of the Year” to describe Terri 
Wells, a former Playboy Playmate of the Year, was held to be a permissible nominative fair use, 
because “[the use] serve[d] to identify Wells as a past PEI ‘Playmate of the Year.’”18
III.  Factual and Procedural Background 
Petitioner KP Permanent, Inc (“KP”) and Respondent Lasting Impression I, Inc.19 
(“Lasting”) manufacture and sell “permanent make-up”; a combination of pigment and liquid 
that is injected under the skin like a tattoo.  Both parties use the term “micro color” in some form 
to market and sell their permanent make-up products.  Lasting registered a trademark for a 
stylized design of the words “Micro Colors” in 1993,20 which became incontestable in 1999.21  
                                                 
16New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
17Id. at 308. 
18 Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 800-02 (9th Cir. 2002). 
19There is some confusion among the courts as to whether the defendant’s name is “Lasting Impression” or “Lasting 
Impression I.”  The District Court uses the former; the Appellate and Supreme Courts use the latter. 
20See Appendix 1. 
21KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression, Inc., No. 00-276-GLT, p. 6 l.8 (D.C. Cal. May 16, 2001) 
(AKP 1"). 
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KP alleged its use of the words “micro colors” began in 1990, pre-dating Lasting’s 1992 initial 
use.22  In 1999, KP produced a 10-page brochure advertising its permanent make-up colors using 
the term “microcolor” in a large stylized typeface.23  Lasting sent KP a cease and desist letter, 
which prompted KP to sue Lasting for trademark infringement in the Central District of 
California (“District Court”), alleging it had a common law trademark in “microcolors” and that 
its use of the term did not infringe Lasting’s logo trademark in “Micro Color.”24  Lasting 
counterclaimed alleging trademark infringement.25  Both parties filed cross motions for summary 
judgment.26
The District Court granted KP’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that KP 
successfully established a fair use defense pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).27  Lasting 
appealed and the Ninth Circuit reversed on numerous grounds including error by the District 
Court for not analyzing the likelihood of confusion in making its decision.28  The Ninth Circuit 
held that a finding of likelihood of confusion precluded a fair use defense.29  It also implied that 
KP bore the burden of disproving likelihood of confusion.30  KP appealed to the Supreme Court, 
                                                 
22Id. at p. 1 line 24. 
23KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003) (AKP 2"); see also 
Appendix 1. 
24KP 1, No. 00-276-GLT at p. 1 l. 19. 
25Id. at p. 1 l. 20. 
26Id. at p. 2 l. 2. 
27Id. at p. 1 l.19. 
28KP 2, 328 F.3d at 1061. 
29Id. at 1073. 
30Id. 
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which granted certiorari on the narrow question of whether an alleged infringer bore the burden 
of proving the absence of confusion when pleading the fair use affirmative defense. 
IV.  The Federal District Court Decision 
The District Court agreed with KP’s claim that the term “micro color” is generic.31  Both 
parties presented evidence of web searches indicating that “microcolors” was used in various 
industries, but not in the permanent make-up industry.32  The district court accepted KP’s logic 
that since “pigment” and “colors” are used interchangeably in the industry, “micropigments” and 
“microcolors” are synonyms.33  Since Lasting did not offer evidence that “micro colors” is not 
used commonly or interchangeably with “micro pigment” or “micro pigment colors,” the court 
found the term “micro color” to be generic.34
The district court found that even if “micro color” is not generic, it is descriptive with no 
secondary meaning.35  Lasting argued that “micro color” and “microcolors” are descriptive 
marks and that KP did not prove it had acquired secondary meaning in the terms.36  The court 
agreed, stating that what holds true for KP also would hold true for Lasting.37  Although 
                                                 
31KP 1, No. 00-276-GLT at p. 4 l. 16; see also Abercrombie & Fitch, Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 
1976) (establishing four categories for trademarks “. . . in an ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility 
to trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, these classes are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) 
suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful”; a generic term cannot be trademarked and a descriptive term requires 
secondary meaning in order to be trademarked). 
32Id. at p. 4 l. 1. 
33Id. at p. 4 l. 12. 
34Id. at p. 4 l. 26. 
35Id. at p. 5 l. 8. 
36Id. at p. 5 l. 10. 
37Id. at p. 6. 
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Lasting’s trademark in “Micro Colors” had achieved incontestable status, which presumes 
secondary meaning, the court found that the mark’s incontestability applied only to the “logo in 
its entirety” not just to “micro colors” textually.38  The only evidence offered indicated that both 
parties were associated with the term “micro colors,” leading the court to decide that neither had 
acquired secondary meaning in the term.39  The district court determined that Lasting could not 
support its allegation of trademark infringement because KP’s use of “micro colors” was fair 
use.40  Lasting conceded the first and third elements of the statutory fair use defense: KP did not 
use “micro colors” as a mark and used it only to describe KP’s products.41  The court found that 
because KP’s use of the term preceded Lasting’s and had been continuous, KP’s use had been 
fair and in good faith,42 satisfying the second element of the statutory fair use defense.  The court 
reasoned there was no issue of material fact as regarding the fair use defense and granted KP’s 
motion for summary judgment.  The court did not reach the issue of likelihood of confusion 
because it had determined that “micro colors” was either generic or descriptive.43
V.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision 
                                                 
38Id. at p. 6 line 10; see also Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, 64 F.3d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(cranberry juice manufacturer did not infringe candy maker=s trademark in “SweeTARTS” by describing cranberry 
juice as “sweet-tart” or as “sweet and tart” even though “SweeTARTS” was an incontestible mark; also Registration 
Support, United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (Jan. 27, 2005) (a registrant of a trademark 
consisting of words and an image must register the words separately as text if the registrant intends the words 
themselves be treated as a trademark). 
39KP 1, No. 000-276-GLT, p. 7 l. 10. 
40Id. at p. 9 l. 2. 
41Id. at p. 8 l. 11. 
42Id. at p. 8 l. 19. 
43Id. at p. 9 l. 8. 
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the District Court’s determination that “micro color” was a 
generic term.44  Lasting’s mark indisputably achieved incontestable status, which “includes the 
specific presumption that the trademark is not generic.”45  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found 
that, under Park ‘N Fly,46 the words “micro colors” were protected by Lasting’s registration of 
the logo because the words were “the most salient feature of the logo trademark,”47 making the 
words themselves incontestable.  The burden was on KP to rebut the presumption that “micro 
colors” was not generic, which the Ninth Circuit ruled KP failed to do at the District Court.48
Because the Ninth Circuit determined that the words “micro colors” had achieved 
incontestable status, it also held that “micro colors” was presumed to have acquired secondary 
meaning.49  Even though the term might be descriptive, it had acquired a secondary meaning for 
trademark purposes.50
The Ninth Circuit found that the District Court erred when it failed to make a 
determination on likelihood of confusion after finding that KP met the requirements for a 
                                                 
44KP 2, 328 F.3d at 1070. 
45Id. at 1069 (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982). 
46Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1983). 
47KP 2, 328 F.3d at 1068 (seems to assume that because the Ninth Circuit=s opinion in Park ‘N Fly was written by 
Judge Kennedy (now Justice Kennedy), the Supreme Court would uphold the Ninth Circuit=s reasoning if the 
question of whether the text in a logo must be registered separately were put to the Supreme Court); see also 
Appendix 1. 
48KP 2, 328 F.3d at 1070. 
49Id. at 1071. 
50Id. (“Thus, Lasting’s incontestable registration is conclusive evidence that the mark is non-descriptive or has 
acquired secondary meaning.”). 
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statutory fair use defense pursuant to 15 U.S.C. ' 1115(b)(4).51  The court reasoned that KP 
could assert a statutory fair use defense only “if there is no likelihood of confusion between KP’s 
use of the term ‘micro color’ and Lasting’s mark,”52 implying being that KP bore the burden of 
proving an absence of confusion if it wanted to raise a classic fair use defense. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case back for 
further consideration. 
VI.  The Supreme Court Decision 
Despite the number of contestable issues raised by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the 
Question Presented to the Supreme Court was very narrow in scope:  Does a party raising the 
statutory fair use affirmative defense to an allegation of trademark infringement pursuant to 15 
U.S.C. ' 1115(b)(4) bear the burden of negating any likelihood that the practice complained of 
will confuse consumers about the origin, source or affiliation of the goods or services affected? 
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court with respect to all but 
footnotes 4, 5 and 6.53  In a strict textual reading of section 1115(b)(4), the Court held that a 
party raising a statutory fair use affirmative defense to an allegation of trademark infringement 
does not bear the burden to negate any likelihood of confusion.54
The Supreme Court answered the question presented, but in doing so, it added another 
                                                 
51Id. at 1072. 
52Id. at 1072; also “. . . the fair use defense claimed by KP is a classic fair use defense that requires that there not be 
a likelihood of confusion,” at 1073 (emphasis added). 
53KP 3, 125 S. Ct. at 545 (noting that Justice Scalia did not join footnotes 4 and 5 and Justice Breyer did not join 
footnote 6). 
54Id. at 548 (noting that the elements of the fair use defense contain nothing about likelihood of confusion and that 
statutory interpretation presumes that when Congress includes a term, such as likelihood of confusion, in one section 
of an Act and omits it in another section of the same Act, the omission was intentional). 
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layer of complexity and confused the issue regarding the role of likelihood of confusion in a fair 
use defense.  The Court was clear that the party asserting a statutory fair use defense is not 
obligated to demonstrate an absence of likelihood of confusion.55  Likewise, it is clear that the 
party alleging trademark infringement does not need to show actual consumer confusion as part 
of its prima facie case, but only that confusion is likely.56
Two additional issues related to likelihood of confusion were raised in the decision – (1) 
whether consumer confusion and fair use could co-exist; and (2) whether the likelihood of 
confusion is a factor in determining fair use.  Prior to KP Permanent, some federal courts 
endorsed McCarthy’s interpretation of trademark law as excluding a fair use defense when the 
plaintiff establishes likelihood of confusion.57  The Court rejected this interpretation because it 
illogically prohibits making a fair use defense in the very situation where it is meant to be used.58 
 The Court explained that fair use, therefore, can occur along with at least some degree of 
consumer confusion.59  This is especially true when the trademark allegedly infringed is a 
descriptive term.60  The Court cited to a line of cases from various courts protecting the right to 
use descriptive language and preventing its “commercial monopolization.”61  The Court did, 
                                                 
55Id. at 550. 
56Id. at 548. 
57 McCarthy section and cases. 
58 KP3, 125 S. Ct. at 549 (“[I]t defies logic to argue that  a defense may not be asserted in the only situation where it 
even becomes relevant.”) (citation omitted). 
59Id. at 550. 
60Id. (“The Lanham Act adopts a similar leniency, there being no indication that the statute was meant to deprive 
commercial speakers of the ordinary utility of descriptive words.”). 
61Id. (citing to Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 201 (1985), which explains “commercial 
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however, acknowledge that the common law of unfair competition recognizes that likelihood of 
confusion may be taken into consideration when determining whether a use is fair.62
Even though some degree of consumer confusion can co-exist with fair use, the Court 
also suggested that there might be a limit as to just how much confusion may be tolerated before 
it prevents a finding of fair use.63  The Court did not, however, offer any guidance as to just how 
much confusion would be needed to tip the scales against a finding of fair use.  To further 
confuse the issue, the Court also implied that the trademark owner might need to show 
something other than consumer confusion to defeat fair use, particularly if there was not so much 
confusion as to clearly tip the scales against a finding of fair use.64  Presumably this “something 
else” would show the defendant’s use either was not fair or was not in good faith. 
Finally, it is important to note that the Court limits its discussion and analysis to statutory 
fair use, leaving open the question of whether its argument can be applied with any degree of 
certainty to nominative fair use.65
Although the Ninth Circuit opinion offered a number of potential appellate issues, 
Petitioner KP focused only on the single question posed—whether a party raising the statutory 
                                                                                                                                                             
monopolization” as the removal of a descriptive mark from the public domain once the mark achieves incontestable 
status.) 
62 Id. at 548-49. 
63 Id. at 551 (Various amici and commentators urged the Court to rule that the degree of consumer confusion bears 
on both the fairness of the use and whether the term can still “realistically be called descriptive.”  The United States 
argued that “used fairly” means the descriptive term accurately describes the goods.  The Court did not rule out 
either argument, stating only “the door is not closed” on the relevance of the likelihood of confusion in determining 
whether a use is “objectively fair.”). 
64Id. at 549 (noting that although the cases the Court cited agree that confusion is a factor to consider in determining 
of whether a use is fair, “they do not stand for the proposition that an assessment of confusion alone may be 
dispositive.”). 
65Id. at 546 n.3. 
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fair use affirmative defense to an allegation of trademark infringement bears the burden of 
negating any likelihood of confusion.  As a result, the Court addressed only part of the problem 
raised by the Ninth Circuit opinion.  The Court did note, however, that other questions were not 
asked and consequently were not going to be answered in its decision.  Issues specifically 
avoided included (1) the role of likelihood of confusion as it applies to nominative fair use;66 (2) 
whether “used fairly” means the term used accurately described the goods;67 and (3) whether the 
degree of confusion could indicate that a once descriptive term had become so closely associated 
with the trademark owner that the term cannot be used in a descriptive sense.68
Petitioner KP elected not to challenge the Ninth Circuit on its conclusion that the words 
“micro colors” had achieved incontestable status because the words were the “most salient 
feature” of the logo that had achieved incontestable status, even though the words themselves 
had not been registered separate and apart from the logo.69  The Supreme Court did not weigh in 
on this issue when it reviewed Park ‘N Fly, which the Ninth Circuit has interpreted to mean the 
Supreme Court agrees with the conclusion.70  If allowed to stand, this interpretation suggests that 
a registrant may register a descriptive term as a stylized logo design and thereby achieve 
incontestable status for the words apart from their depiction as the logo.  For example, a 
                                                 
66Id. (not surprising  since the Court has never recognized or addressed “nominative fair use”). 
67Id. at 551 (noting only that accuracy would be a consideration in the determination of fair use, but declining to go 
further). 
68Id. 
69Supra note 47; see also General Foods Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14572, 15 (N.D. Ill. 1976) 
(the dominant portion of a trademark gets greater consideration when determining whether there is a likelihood of 
confusion, and therefore, infringement). 
70 KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1068. 
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laundromat owner might register the phrase “Wash ‘N Watch” with a graphic of a front-loading 
washer and an old-fashioned television set as a logo.  After achieving incontestable status, the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation means the laundromat owner would have an incontestable mark in 
the entire logo and also in the phrase “Wash ‘N Watch” as text alone.  Another laundromat 
owner who installs a large-screen television set in her laundromat and puts up a sign reading 
“Betty’s Wash and Watch” would bear the burden of proving that “Wash ‘N Watch” does not 
have a secondary meaning associated with the trademark owner’s establishment.  This makes the 
argument that a use is fair more difficult. 
VII.  Conclusion 
The implications of KP Permanent for trademark infringement plaintiffs are clear, 
whereas defendants have a less sure path to successfully asserting a statutory fair use defense.  
Plaintiffs alleging infringement of a descriptive mark can no longer rely on the mere existence of 
a likelihood of confusion to defeat a statutory fair use defense.  Such plaintiffs will need to show 
not just a likelihood of consumer confusion, but enough confusion to negate the assertion that the 
allegedly infringing use was fair.  The amount of confusion deemed “enough” is likely to vary 
from case to case, based on how the mark is being used and other fact-specific circumstances.  
While some confusion will not defeat statutory fair use, substantial confusion might.71
Since confusion alone may not be enough to defeat a statutory fair use defense, plaintiffs 
alleging trademark infringement should be prepared to present evidence that the defendant did 
                                                 
71RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 28, cmt b (1995) (“The fair use defense recognized in this 
Section can be applicable even if the trademark owner presents evidence sufficient to prove a likelihood of 
confusion. . . . A defendant who uses a descriptive term fairly and in good faith to describe its goods or services is 
not liable for infringement even if some residual confusion is likely.  However, the strength of the plaintiff=s mark 
and the extent of likely or actual confusion are important factors in determining whether a use is fair.”). 
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not act “fairly and in good faith.”  Such evidence also may defeat one of the three prongs of the 
statutory fair use defense.  After KP Permanent, parties defending against an allegation of 
trademark infringement in the Ninth Circuit do not have the burden to negate likelihood of 
confusion when raising a fair use defense.  If the plaintiff can establish likelihood of confusion 
sufficient to show that defendant’s use was not fair, the defendant will need to offer “rebutting 
evidence to undercut the force of the plaintiff’s evidence.”72
While the KP Permanent decision reverses the Ninth Circuit’s expansion of trademark 
rights, it does so only on the narrow point of the defendant’s burden of negating confusion when 
asserting a statutory fair use defense.  It does not, however, bring clarity to other expansions of 
trademark rights by the Ninth Circuit and other federal courts.  Those clarifications must await 
another day. 
                                                 
72 KP 3, 125 S. Ct. at 549. 
Originally published in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
Cite as: 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 289 
 
 
 303
Appendix 1 
 
Lasting Impression I, Inc. 
Registered Trademark 
 
Reg. No. 1,769,592. 
 
 
 
KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. 
Brochure Chart Heading 
 
